Latest IDP Report released 22 October 2008
Internal Displacement and International Law in Eastern Burma 2008 Survey (TBBC)
	English (PDF: 10.7Mb)

Note: A limited number of hard copies are available. Contact us if you would like one.

[Rev: Oct 08]

IDP Report released 19 October 2007
Internal Displacement in Eastern Burma - 2007 Survey (TBBC)
English (PDF: 8.0Mb)	Burmese (PDF: 9.9Mb)	Thai (PDF: 11.1Mb)

Note: A limited number of hard copies are available. Contact us if you would like one.

[Rev: May 08]

Also see (on this page)
Conflict-induced displacement
Development-induced displacement
Scale and distribution of internal displacement
Internally displaced persons in ethnic ceasefire areas
Internally displaced persons in hiding sites
Internally displaced persons in SPDC relocation sites

Also download (on this website)
Internal Displacement and Protection in Eastern Burma, TBBC 2005
Internal Displacement and Vulnerability in Eastern Burma, TBBC 2004

Conflict-induced displacement

In the past ten years, Burma Army offensives have occupied vast tracts of customary land belonging to villagers from the non-Burman ethnic nationalities. Whereas villagers could previously retreat into areas administered by the armed opposition closer to the border, there is now nowhere safe to run. To consolidate territorial gains, the central government has doubled the deployment of battalions in eastern Burma since 1996. In 2007, at least 273 infantry and light infantry battalions were permanently based in eastern Burma while many more were involved in roving patrols. Given that rations for frontline Burma Army troops have been cut, villagers have had rice fields and fruit plantations confiscated to support this militarisation. Displacement has primarily been induced by the increased capacity of the Burma Army to search contested areas for civilians hiding in the forests.

[Rev: Feb 08]

Development-induced displacement

Forced displacement is also increasingly related to state-sponsored development projects. By focusing on infrastructure construction and commercial agriculture, the government’s Border Areas Development programme has done little to alleviate poverty in conflict-affected areas. Conversely, these initiatives have often undermined livelihoods and primarily served to consolidate military control over the rural population. Proposed dams along the Salween River have already forcibly displaced over 35,000 people, while the livelihoods of those remaining are threatened by forced labour for road construction and deforestation caused by logging. The government’s promotion of castor oil plantations to produce bio-diesel has induced widespread land confiscation, the imposition of procurement quotas and forced labour to cultivate seedlings.

[Rev: Feb 08]

Scale and distribution of internal displacement

The overall rate of displacement in eastern Burma remains critical. During the past year alone, at least 76,000 people were forced to leave their homes as a result of, or in order to avoid, the effects of conflict and human rights abuses. While the distribution of forced migration was widespread, the most significant concentration was in four townships of northern Karen state and eastern Pegu Division where counter-insurgency operations displaced approximately 43,000 civilians. Border-wide, at least 167 entire villages were forcibly displaced during the same period. Community based organisations have now documented over 3,200 separate incidents of village destruction, relocation or abandonment in eastern Burma since 1996. This reflects the cumulative impact of the Burmese Army’s expanded presence and forced relocation campaign targeting civilians in contested areas.

Internal displacement in eastern Burma, however, is more commonly associated with the coerced movements of smaller groups rather than entire villages. This relates to impoverishment and forced migration caused by the confiscation of land, asset stripping, forced procurement policies, agricultural production quotas, forced labour, arbitrary taxation, extortion and restrictions on access to fields and markets. The compulsory and unavoidable nature of these factors is distinct from the voluntary, profit-oriented, “pull-factors” more commonly associated with economic migration.

The total number of internally displaced persons who have been forced or obliged to leave their homes and have not been able to return or resettle and reintegrate into society is estimated to be at least half a million people. This population includes approximately 295,000 people in the temporary settlements of ceasefire areas administered by ethnic nationalities. A further 109,000 villagers have been evicted from their homes by SPDC and obliged to move into designated relocation sites. The most vulnerable group consists of at least 99,000 civilians who are hiding from the SPDC in areas most affected by military skirmishes and humanitarian atrocities. These population figures are considered conservative, as it has not been possible to survey urban areas. Similarly, internally displaced persons in mixed administration areas have not been counted because it has not been possible to verify how many have successfully reintegrated into society.

[Rev: Feb 08]

Internally displaced persons in hiding sites

An estimated 99,000 civilians are hiding in the most militarily contested areas, which are generally located in remote and mountainous forests and fields. This type of geography strengthens the ability of the armed opposition forces to move undetected and weakens the logistical advantage of the government forces. Forests, besides their obvious environmental benefits, also provide shelter under which internally displaced populations can hide their temporary settlements.

This population has fled from their homes to avoid contact with SPDC military patrols due to fear of harassment under the pretext of counter insurgency activities. People in hiding may not move far from their homes, which is a key motivating factor for remaining despite the risks of being detected by SPDC or paramilitary patrols. However, while there may be opportunities for people to return periodically to nearby villages and fields, the risks prohibit the possibility of a more sustainable return or resettlement.

The categorisation of these people as members of the armed opposition for disobeying relocation orders contravenes the government’s obligations under codified International Humanitarian Law to distinguish between civilians and combatants. Threats to lives include heavy artillery shelling of civilian settlements, landmines, summary execution and inhumane punishment if captured. If settlements are discovered uninhabited, livelihoods are commonly undermined by the burning of civilian dwellings and the destruction or theft of crops and food stocks. Offences documented in this report constitute not merely more examples of human rights abuses which are widespread in Burma, but rather are indicative of the crimes against humanity that are committed against civilians hiding in conflict-affected areas.

Counter-insurgency military operations during the past year have particularly targeted civilians in northern Karen and eastern Pegu Division. At least 38 civilians have been killed by Burmese Army patrols in Thundering Township alone during 2007 to date, while over 60,000 villagers are currently hiding from government forces. This denotes an increase of approximately 7,000 people since 2006, and represents the number of people who were previously living with the tacit approval of local SPDC authorities in mixed administration areas. However, local arrangements became null and void when the Southern and South Eastern Military Commands coordinated patrols by over 40 battalions to search for civilian settlements and destroy their means of survival. This level of coordination is illustrative of the systematic nature of the Burmese Army’s crimes against humanity.

[Rev: Feb 08]

Internally displaced persons in
ethnic ceasefire areas

People in ethnic-administered ceasefire areas represent the largest category of internally displaced persons in eastern Burma. The 2007 survey estimates there are approximately 295,000 displaced people residing throughout areas in eastern Burma administered by ceasefire groups, who have each been granted a relative degree of autonomy by the Burma Army. This authority is generally formalised by the demarcation of special regions, with the main exceptions being in the areas of southern Shan State which are claimed by the United Wa State Army (UWSA). Authorities in ceasefire areas can generally be divided into three types. There are former members or allies of the Communist Party of Burma, militias who split from the main political party representing their ethnic group and former members of the armed opposition’s National Democratic Front.

Approximately 77,000 people are estimated to remain in areas nominally governed by the UWSA along the Thailand border. This population primarily consists of villagers who were evicted from their homes in northern Shan state between 1999 and 2001 and forcibly relocated for strategic and supposedly drug eradication purposes. Autocratic rule and the ongoing suppression of rights by the UWSA has obstructed opportunities for people to re-establish their livelihoods, while at the same time inducing further displacement amongst former land owners whose property had been seized to accommodate the new arrivals. Harassment from SPDC patrols also increased in 2007, especially since the UWSA refused orders to relocate its troops and constituents back to their original base on the Chinese border. About 2,500 villagers have fled from UWSA areas in Mong Ton and moved to Mong Hsat as a result of this harassment by SPDC troops.

In contrast, ceasefire areas, where the legitimacy of ethnic nationality authorities is less disputed, provide a relative degree of protection for displaced communities. Over 60,000 people are currently residing in the New Mon State Party’s (NMSP) 12 designated ceasefire areas. This includes former refugees who were repatriated from Thailand back into a situation in flux over ten years ago as well as villagers from SPDC controlled areas who have fled from systematic human rights abuses. Over 1,000 new arrivals have been reported seeking refuge in the NMSP cease-fire areas in 2007 alone. However, these areas can not provide a sustainable solution for the internally displaced due to population density, limited access to suitable agricultural land, SPDC restrictions on travel outside of cease-fire areas, and the inability of ethnic nationality authorities to support resettlement or compensate for livelihood assets lost. The Rangoon-based international community’s attempts to access and assist these displaced communities have been largely ineffective since the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) was forced to suspend operations from field offices in October 2006.

Other ceasefire parties include the Karenni National People’s Liberation Front (KNPLF), the Shan State Army-North (SSA-N), the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) and the Shan Nationalities’ Peoples Liberation Organisation (SNPLO). However, the boundary between areas primarily influenced by non-state actors and those under the administration of Burmese authorities is porous. SPDC’s expansion into ceasefire areas during the past year has effectively reduced the displaced population under the administration of KNPLF, SSA-N and SNPLO in particular. This expansion has manifested in various ways including orders for villages to be relocated, confiscation of land and property, imposition of forced labour, and restrictions on trade and travel. As long as the human rights dividends accruing from ceasefire agreements remain negligible, their sustainability continues to be undermined.

[Rev: Feb 08]

Internally displaced persons in
SPDC relocation sites

The third category of internally displaced persons in eastern Burma consists of approximately 109,000 villagers who currently reside in designated relocation sites after having been evicted from their homes. Government relocation sites are generally situated on barren land near a town or village and in close proximity to roads and SPDC army bases. Relocation sites can result from either the forced transfer of villages to a newly constructed centre, or the forced consolidation of dispersed villages into a more densely populated pre-existing settlement.

Population estimates for internally displaced persons in relocation sites have decreased by 9,000 people since 2006. This is primarily due to movements out of relocation sites in Tenser Division, and to lesser extent in Shan State, related to a relaxation in restrictions imposed by local SPDC commanders. Rather than reflecting increased freedom, this is illustrative of expanded SPDC control over surrounding mixed administration areas. As villagers in surrounding areas become resigned to complying with Burmese Army orders, the Spec’s perceived need for relocation sites becomes redundant.

Conversely, a renewed campaign of forced evictions and village relocations has been reported in the contested areas of northern Karen State, Peg Division and northern Mon State. This campaign is part of SPDC counter-insurgency operations which attempt to divide upland and lowland Karen communities in order to undermine the armed opposition of the Karen National Union.

Villagers were generally obliged to dismantle their houses and carry whatever property and food stocks were transportable to the designated relocation site within a few days notice. There is commonly no assistance provided for the reconstruction of shelters and tenancy is usually not officially registered. Restrictions on movement outside of relocation sites vary, with travel passes for between days to a week generally available for purchase from SPDC military commanders. These passes guarantee passage through checkpoints and into markets but single day passes are often not long enough to enable people to return to their homes and fields.

Apart from the fundamentally coercive nature of population movements into SPDC relocation sites and the loss of property as a result of displacement, possibilities for resettlement and reintegration are also restricted by limited livelihood options. Limited access to suitable agricultural land is largely caused by the relocation site’s proximity to towns and to SPDC army bases, where lands have been confiscated to support the soldiers, or due to population density and barren soil. Villagers living in close proximity to SPDC bases are also commonly forced to pay arbitrary taxes at irregular and short notice and ordered to work without compensation, which takes away time from earning income to support their families.

[Rev: Feb 08]